Implicações da assimetria de informação no mercado de crédito: o caso do relacionamento entre os agricultores do ChóKwé e o sector bancário local

Abstract

This paper aims to assess the extent to which information asymmetry constitutes a barrier to the flow of credit to the agricultural sector in Mozambique. The study takes as reference the farmers in the Chókwè irrigation system (Gaza province). In recent years, the proportion of credit allocated to the agricultural sector at the national banking level has been decreasing sharply, when compared to credit allocated to other sectors. In specific terms, the work aims to carry out an empirical analysis of the implications of information asymmetry in the relationship between banks and potential borrowers linked to the agricultural sector. To achieve the objectives of the work, a mixed methodology was used, with emphasis on the deductive and comparative methods. The empirical results were collected from a sample of 50 farmers belonging to the Union of Agricultural Cooperatives of Limpopo (UCAL) which comprises associations of small and large producers throughout the Chókwè irrigation system. From the analysis carried out, it was found that the decreasing trend in the proportion of credit allocated to agriculture in the period after financial liberalization is, among other factors, associated with information asymmetry both in the relationship between financial institutions and producers, and within the producers themselves. Since the market by itself is still not able to resolve the failures arising from its own functioning, it is recommended: (i) The development of actions that allow for a greater approximation between the banking sector and farmers, and this involves, for example, by training farmers on the rational use of credit, through coordination between the State and the banking sector; (ii) On the assumption that most farmers are poor, the funding of farmers associations can be a means of supporting them, as the responsibility in this situation is solidary and the level of moral hazard may be lower when compared to funding individual; (iii) As a matter of reflection, the creation of an institution that guarantees insurance against the risks of bad results of the agricultural campaign, in which Social Action funds can be used, through the creation of a package for this purpose.(TRADUÇÃO NOSSA)