As possibilidades de accountability dos deputados para com o eleitorado num sistema eleitoral de representação proporcional e de listas partidárias – o caso do círculo eleitoral de gaza.

Abstract

The present study aims to analyze what possibilities the Mozambican electoral system of proportional representation creates for the occurrence of deputies' accountability to voters. The problem underlying the objective is linked to the fact that the proportional representation electoral system does not theoretically favor accountability from deputies to voters, but from deputies to their political parties that puts them on the electoral list. In this way, surveys carried out in Mozambique and in several countries, have concluded that this electoral system due, on the one hand, to the strong party discipline guiding the action of the parties represented in parliament, means that the deputies do not strive to satisfy the interests of the voters. in electoral circles and on the other hand, they take away from the representatives the need to take to the parliament the concerns of their electorate because loyalty to party ideals is sufficient for their reelection. However, it is concluded in this study that, although there is a weak contact between the deputies and the voters, the few that exist, by telephone and use of the available media, are sufficient for the occurrence of accountability, since in the few existing meetings, situations of informational and other argumentative dimensions are verified, which are basic indicators for the occurrence of accountability. (TRADUÇÃO NOSSA)