A falseabilidade como pressuposto para o progresso científico em Karl Popper

Abstract

Since ancient times, the criterion for demarcating what is science and what is not has been debated. The notion of science that was then held coincided with the search for absolute knowledge. It became necessary for Greek thinkers, including Aristotle, Pythagoras and Descartes, to consolidate a precise distinction between contingent knowledge and necessary knowledge, since the only discourse that could satisfy the demands of scientific rigor was one that pointed out, in phenomena, causal connections whose necessity could be demonstrated. Before Popper, Western philosophical thought spent centuries trying to explain why our theories were often wrong. In his fundamental work, The Logic of Scientific Research, Karl Popper puts the epistemological discussion in new terms by demonstrating that error, instead of being an evil that can be avoided by resorting to some specific methodological procedure, constitutes an inevitable component of any scientific theory, being the engine by which science moves. Seeking to capture the logic of the development of science, Popper begins his exposition by destroying what was perhaps, of all the philosophical principles, the most dear to scientists and most philosophers of his time: the principle of induction as a method of scientific procedure. This work addresses some of the main topics of Popperian thought, such as the principle of induction, the conception of science and falsifiability. It also attempts to introduce some philosophical debates on scientific progress, juxtaposing the opinions of Popper and those of critics of his thought(TRADUÇÃO NOSSA)