O fim da guerra colonial em Moçambique: factores e circunstâncias

Abstract

It is well known that wars only start when diplomatic means of resolving disputes do not achieve the intended objectives. But when it ends, questions remain to be clarified, especially when it does not occur as a result of a defeat by one of the parties on the ground. In 1964, when war broke out in Mozambique, all the diplomacy of Mondlane and other Mozambicans aiming at the independence of the territory under the United Nations charter had failed. Salazar, that, supported the thesis of "the defense of the Overseas by the force of the Arms". The launching of the "Górdio Node" operation in 1970 corresponds to the continuation of Salazar's policy of defending the Ultramar by force of arms and aimed at the victorious end of the war in a short time, through a complex articulation of military means with those of psychological warfare. By the end of 1972, all the initial conviction of the colonial authorities regarding the operation "Górdio's Node" had disappeared and, in 1974, the dynamics and progress of the war began to panic a large part of the European sector of the populations of the center that had not yet he believed in his approach to war. The massacres and the speed of the Africanization of the war, through the constitution of different corps of African troops (Arrows, Commands, GE's and GEP's), characterized the activation of the Portuguese army between the end of 1972 and the year of 1974. The more motivated Frelimo Guerrilla moved further south, increasingly worrying South Africa and Rhodesia, collaborators with the Portuguese Armed Forces for some years. Spinola, considered in 1973 that "the contingency of the Military calapso was getting closer and closer" and that "the state of deterioration in which the armed forces were, made the military solution to the problem of Overseas unfeasible" which required a political solution as an alternative. In turn, Costa Gomes recognized, „in Mozambique,„-in-the-beginning of 1974,.., that "We are in a difficult situation, subversion has expanded to the south and cannot be efficiently fought by the military forces". If one considers Salazar's position at the beginning of the war in 1964, the triggering and objectives of the Nó Górdio operation in 1970, it can be clearly seen that, by the considerations of Spínola in 1973(TRADUÇÃO NOSSA)